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League of Conservation Voters v. Trump, 363 F. Supp. 3d 1013 (D.
Alaska 2019)
Adam W. Johnson
A consortium of environmental groups brought suit challenging
an executive order opening millions of acres of continental shelf lands to
oil and gas leasing. The Court held that the President’s actions exceeded
his statutory authority and intruded on Congress’s power under the
Property Clause, violating the separation of powers doctrine.
I. INTRODUCTION
League of Conservation Voters v. Trump involved a statutory
interpretation of the Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act (“OCSLA”),
specifically whether the text of Section 12(a) of OCSLA authorizes the
President to revoke a prior withdrawal of unleased Outer Continental Shelf
(“OCS”) lands from oil and gas leasing.1
The United States District Court for the District of Alaska found
that the text, structure, and legislative history of OCSLA indicated that
Congress intended to delegate to the President only the authority to
withdraw OCS lands from leasing, and not the commensurate power to
revoke a prior President’s withdrawal.2 Thus, President Trump’s executive
order revoking a prior withdrawal was unlawful and invalid.3
II. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
In 1953, Congress passed the Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act
in order to give the United States jurisdiction over OCS lands and
tfacilitate the development of oil and gas extraction leases. 4 OCSLA
authorized the Secretary of the Interior to grant and regulate leases for oil
and gas extraction on OCS lands.5 Additionally, Section 12(a) of OCSLA
states that “The President of the United States may, from time to time,
withdraw from disposition any of the unleased lands of the outer
Continental Shelf.”6 Pursuant to Section 12(a), President Obama, in 2015
and 2016, issued an executive order and three memoranda withdrawing
specific areas of the OCS from leasing. 7 These withdrawals were intended
to last for an indefinite period of time, revocable only by an act of

1.
League of Conservation Voters v. Trump, 363 F. Supp. 3d 1013 (D.
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Congress. 8 President Obama cited concerns over protection of marine
mammals and wildlife that are crucial to the subsistence of Alaska Natives
as the impetus for the withdrawal.9 In April 2017, President Trump issued
Executive Order 13795 (“Executive Order”), purporting to reverse
President Obama’s 2015 and 2016 withdrawals in the Arctic and Atlantic
Oceans.10
On May 3, 2017, a consortium of Environmental NGOs
(“Plaintiffs) sued President Donald Trump, Secretary of Interior Ryan
Zinke, and Secretary of Commerce Wilbur Ross (“Defendants”) in U.S.
District Court alleging Executive Order 1375 exceeded the President’s
statutory authority under Section 12(a) of OCSLA, and “intruded on
Congress’s non-delegated exclusive power under the Property Clause, in
violation of the doctrine of separation of powers.”11 After the Court denied
the defendants’ motion to dismiss, the parties filed cross motions for
summary judgment.12
III. ANALYSIS
The parties presented differing interpretations of the textual
meaning of Section 12(a) of OCSLA, as well as the legislative intent and
the significance of executive actions taken subsequent to the passage of
OCSLA. Plaintiffs argued that the text of Section 12(a) “does not
expressly authorize the President to revoke a prior withdrawal, and that in
the absence of express delegation of its power under the Property Clause,
the authority to revoke prior withdrawals “remains vested solely with
Congress.”13
Defendants argued that Plaintiffs’ interpretation of OCSLA would
render parts of the statute superfluous, and that Section 12(a)'s
“discretionary formulation—authorizing action that ‘may’ be taken ‘from
time to time’—carries with it a power to revise action previously taken
under the delegated authority.”14 They also argued that Congress’s failure
to object to several prior modifications or reductions of withdrawals
pursuant to Section 12(a) represented acquiescence to the President’s
unmitigated power to revoke.15

8.
Id. at 1022.
9.
League of Conservation Voters v. Trump, 303 F. Supp. 3d 985, 990
(D. Alaska 2018).
10.
Implementing an America-First Offshore Energy Strategy, Exec.
Order No. 13795, 82 Fed. Reg. 20815, §§ 4(c), 5 (Apr. 28, 2017).
11.
Id. at 991.
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League of Conservation Voters, 363 F. Supp. 3d at 1017.
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A. Text of Section 12(a) of OCSLA
The text of Section 12(a) of OCLSA reads, in relevant part: “The
President of the United States may, from time to time, withdraw from
disposition any of the unleased lands of the outer Continental Shelf.”16 The
Defendants argued that the phrase “from time to time” conferred upon the
President the power to revoke prior withdrawals, and cited an assortment
of non-binding authority in support of their claim. 17 In particular,
Defendants relied on State v. McBride, a 1902 Washington Supreme Court
decision concerning a Washington state constitutional provision which
empowered the legislature to, “from time to time,” increase the number of
judges sitting on its supreme court. 18 In McBride, the Washington
legislature passed a law temporarily increasing the number of judges to
seven, with the number decreasing back to five in one year’s time.19 A
citizen sued, arguing that the Washington Constitution only gave the
legislature authority to increase the number of judges.
The Washington Supreme Court disagreed, holding that if the
legislature has the power to increase the number of judges at its sole
discretion, “it follows that a decrease may be had to this minimum when
necessity or occasion requires, of which necessity or occasion the
legislature is the exclusive judge.”20 The McBride Court also noted that
the fact that the Washington Constitution placed a minimum limit and
permitted an increase in the number of judges “is a strong inference that
the increased number may be reduced to the minimum.”21
The Court distinguished McBride from the case at hand.
For one, the President is not the “exclusive judge” of which OCS lands are
available for lease, as the Washington state legislature was with regard to
the number of judges on their supreme court. 22 Second, unlike the
minimum number of judges set forth in the Washington Constitution, “no
such minimum limit exists in Section 12(a) with respect to the lands
available for leasing in the OCS.”23
The Court proceeded to make several observations about the text
of Section 12(a). First, Section 12(a) makes no mention of Presidential
authority to revoke a previous withdrawal of OCS lands from disposition,
and the Court noted that “[C]ongress appears to have expressed one
concept—withdrawal—and excluded the converse—revocation.” 24
Furthermore, the Court found that the phrase “from time to time” appeared
to merely give the President discretion to withdraw lands at any time, with
16.
43 U.S.C. § 1341(a) (2012).
17.
League of Conservation Voters, 363 F. Supp. 3d at 1022.
18.
Id. at 1022–23 (quoting State ex rel. Murphy v. McBride, 70 P. 25,
26–27 (Wash. 1902).
19.
Id.
20.
Id.
21.
Id.
22.
Id. at 1023.
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Id.
24.
Id.
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the duration of any given withdrawal also at the President’s discretion.25
However, the Court also noted that “the phrase could be interpreted more
broadly to accord to each President the authority to revoke or modify any
prior withdrawal.” 26 In light of this ambiguity, the Court undertook an
analysis of the context and legislative history of OCSLA to ascertain the
intentions of Congress with respect to Section 12(a).
B. Structure and Legislative History of OCSLA
As a matter of statutory interpretation, a statute should be read as
a whole, and to the extent possible, should be interpreted to “give effect to
all provisions, so that no part will be inoperative or superfluous, void, or
insignificant.”27 Section 8 of OCSLA gives the Secretary of the Interior
the power to lease OCS lands, “in order to meet the urgent need for further
exploration and development of the oil and gas deposits.”28 Section 12,
however, is “entirely protective” in nature, dealing with restrictions on the
uses of OCS lands.29 The Court held that “OCSLA's structure promotes
the view that Section 12(a) did not grant revocation authority to the
President,” because interpreting Section 8 to promote “expeditious leasing”
while reading Section 12(a) as merely granting the President authority to
ban leasing in certain areas gives fuller effect to the differing roles of all
OCSLA’s sections.30
The parties also presented differing interpretations of the
legislative history of Section 12(a). The Defendants referenced a Senate
report in which the Committee on Interior and Consular Affairs said, “it
was vesting withdrawal authority comparable to that which is vested in
[the President] with respect to federally owned lands on the uplands.”31
According to the Defendants, since the President has the power to revoke
withdrawals on the uplands, “Section 12(a) should be interpreted to do the
same.”32
In contrast, the Plaintiffs cited several statutes similar to OCSLA
to stand for the proposition that when Congress has intended to delegate
authority to withdraw public land from disposition along with the power
to revoke such withdrawals, it has done so clearly and unequivocally.33
For example, the Picket Act of 1910 not only gave the President the
authority to “temporarily withdraw” public lands, but expressly said that
such withdrawals would be effective “until revoked by the President or by

25.
26.
27.
824 (2018).
28.
29.
30.
31.
32.
33.

Id.
Id.
Id. at 1025 (quoting Rubin v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 138 S. Ct. 816,
Id. at 1024 (quoting 43 U.S.C. § 1337 (2012)).
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1025 (quoting S. Rep. No. 83-411, at 26 (1953).
Id. at 1026.
Id.
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an Act of Congress.”34 Similarly, a 1935 act “concerning use of the Rio
Grande” explicitly conferred both the power to withdraw and to revoke.35
The Court compared these to statutes passed prior to OCSLA where
Congress delegated to the President only the power to set aside lands, not
to revoke.36 The Antiquities Act of 1906 and the Forest Reserve Act of
1891 both authorized the reservation of public lands, with no mention of
revocation.37 The Court found this highly persuasive, holding that “had
Congress intended to grant the President revocation authority, it could
have done so explicitly, as it had previously done in several (but not all)
of its previously enacted uplands laws.”38 They reasoned that the lack of
revocation authority in Section 12(a) was therefore “likely purposeful.”39
Finally, the Court assessed Plaintiffs’ argument that prior
Attorneys General opinions have interpreted statutes similar to OCSLA as
not providing the President with the power to revoke reservations, and that
“[w]hen it chooses the wording of a statute, Congress is presumptively
aware of Executive Branch interpretations of similar language in parallel
statutes.”40 An 1848 opinion by the Attorney General said that “if lands
have been once set apart by the President in an order for military purposes,
they cannot again be restored to the condition of public lands, or sold as
such, except by an authority of Congress.” 41 Accordingly, the Court
agreed that in the past, when Congress wanted the Executive to have
revocation authority, it has delegated that power explicitly. Therefore,
“Congress intended to authorize the President only to withdraw OCS lands
from leasing in Section 12(a) of OCSLA, and did not authorize the
President to revoke a prior withdrawal.”42
C. Acquiescence
Lastly, the Court considered Defendants’ argument that in the past,
Congress has not objected to presidential modifications or reductions of
prior withdrawals, and therefore “Congress has acquiesced to the
President's authority to revoke under the statute.”43 Since the passage of
OCSLA, there have been just twelve actions taken pursuant to Section
12(a). According to the Defendants, five of those actions involved
modifications while two were reductions of prior withdrawals.44

34.
Id. (quoting Picket Act of 1910, 36 Stat. 847 (1910), repealed by 90
Stat. 2792 (1976)).
35.
Id.
36.
Id. at 1027.
37.
Id.
38.
Id.
39.
Id.
40.
Id.
41.
Id. (quoting Camp Wright, California, 16 Op. Att'y Gen. 121, 123
(Aug. 10, 1878)).
42.
Id. at 1028.
43.
Id. at 1030.
44.
Id.
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The Court was not convinced, saying that “Congress's decisions
not to challenge the small number of prior revocations falls far short of the
high bar required to constitute acquiescence.” 45 Too little information
existed surrounding the reasons for Congress’s “limited inaction,” and so
was insufficient to overcome the Court’s findings regarding the text and
legislative background of Section 12(a).46
IV. CONCLUSION
Based on the text, structure, and legislative history of Section
12(a), the Court held President Trump’s Executive Order to be unlawful
and invalid. 47 Therefore, the previous withdrawals issued by President
Obama “will remain in full force and effect unless and until revoked by
Congress.” 48 Additionally, the power to revoke any future reservations
under Section 12(a) of OCSLA remains vested solely with Congress. This
is significant not only for the preservation of the 128 million acres
preserved by the Obama Section 12(a) withdrawals, but also for similar
future or past withdrawals under OCSLA or made pursuant to similar
statutes such as the Antiquities Act of 1906.

45.
46.
47.
48.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1031.

